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IS RESTORATIVE JUSTICE COMPATIBLE
WITH SENTENCING UNIFORMITY?
MICHAEL M. O'HEAR*
I am grateful to the coordinators of this symposium for the
opportunity to offer a few comments inspired by the thought-provoking
article of Mark Umbreit, Betty Vos, Robert Coates, and Elizabeth
Lightfoot.1 The authors have given us an unusually thorough and
engaging assessment of the research on restorative justice ("RI"). My
own scholarship has focused primarily on sentencing within the
conventional criminal justice framework; not surprisingly, then, my
comments will be those of one who wonders to what extent we can look
to RJ as the foundation for a reformed sentencing process.
As Umbreit and his colleagues put it, RJ represents "an entirely
different way of understanding and responding to crime and conflict,"2
one that offers "a far more accountable, understandable, and healing
system of justice and law."3  Their vision of a transformed criminal
justice system holds considerable appeal, if only because the
conventional system seems such a dismal failure. It is a system that
manages to alienate both offenders and victims.4 It is a system that
incarcerates Americans at rates that are unrivaled among western
democracies,5 and African American males, in particular, at rates that
* Associate Professor, Marquette University Law School. J.D., Yale Law School, 1996;
B.A., Yale College, 1991. Editor, Federal Sentencing Reporter.
1. Mark S. Umbreit et al., Restorative Justice in the Twenty-First Century: A Social
Movement Full of Opportunities and Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251 (2005).
2. Id. at 300.
3. Id. at 304.
4. See id. at 254-55 (noting that conventional system denies victims legal standing and
places both offenders and victims in passive roles); JAMES Q. WHITMAN, HARSH JUSTICE:
CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT AND THE WIDENING DIVIDE BETWEEN AMERICA AND EUROPE 9
(2003) ("On the deepest level, American criminal justice displays a resistance to considering
the very personhood of offenders."); Susan Herman, Is Restorative Justice Possible Without a
Parallel System for Victims?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 75, 75 (Howard
Zehr & Barb Toews eds., 2004) ("Many victims of crime feel ignored, excluded, and
profoundly disrespected by the criminal justice system."). Empirical research indicates that
victims and offenders report higher satisfaction levels when in RJ programs than in the
conventional criminal justice system. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 274.
5. Michael M. O'Hear, Sentencing the Green-Collar Offender: Punishment, Culpability,
and Environmental Crime, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 133,196-97 (2004). As of the end
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ought to be regarded as a national scandal.6 Yet, recidivism remains the
norm,7 the system is widely perceived as too lenient,8 and the public
continues to believe that crime rates are on the rise.9 What, then, could
we possibly have to lose in restructuring the system as RJ envisions?
Among skeptics of RJ, one of the standard answers is that we may
sacrifice uniformity in sentencing.1" Broadly speaking, uniformity means
that similarly situated offenders are sentenced similarly, while
differently situated offenders are sentenced appropriately differently."
Since the 1970's, uniformity has emerged as a-perhaps the-leading
objective of American sentencing systems. 2 Accordingly, RJ advocates
cannot afford to ignore claims that RJ is incompatible with uniformity.13
In this Essay, I aim to examine such claims in a more analytically
rigorous fashion than has previously been attempted.
As Umbreit and his colleagues observe, RJ can take many different
forms. For present purposes, I will identify RJ with its "most widely
practiced" form, that is, RJ "dialogue" (encompassing such overlapping
categories of practices as victim-offender mediation, group
of 2003, one in every 140 residents of the United States was incarcerated. U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2003, at 2 (2004).
6. As of the end of 2003, the incarceration rate for black males was 3405 out of every
100,000, as compared to only 465 for white males. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2003, at 9 (2004).
7. See PATRICK A. LANGAN & DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994, at 1 (2002)
(determining that, among prisoners released in 1994, more than two-thirds were rearrested
for a new offense within three years).
8. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, at 140-41 (30th ed. 2002) (reporting survey data showing
that, in 2002, more than two-thirds of respondents answered that courts did not deal "harshly
enough" with criminals).
9. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, at tbl.2.31 (31st ed. 2003) (reporting survey data showing
that, in 2003, sixty percent of respondents felt that crime had increased in the past year).
10. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Goodbye to Hammurabi: Analyzing the Atavistic Appeal
of Restorative Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 751, 759, 768 (2000); Sara Sun Beale, Still Tough on
Crime? Prospects for Restorative Justice in the United States, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 413, 433;
David Dolinko, Restorative Justice and the Justification of Punishment, 2003 UTAH L. REV.
319, 331-34; Paul H. Robinson, The Virtues of Restorative Processes, the Vices of "Restorative
Justice," 2003 UTAH L. REV. 375,381.
11. For a discussion of the semantic difficulties with the term "uniformity," see Michael
M. O'Hear, The Myth of Uniformity, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 249,249 (2005).
12. Michael M. O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing 75 U.
CIN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (pdf at 2, 11, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.-
cfm?abstractid=800831).
13. Umbreit and his colleagues do not discuss this issue in depth, but note its
significance. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 304.
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conferencing, and sentencing circles). 4  As a component of the
sentencing process, I take it that the essential features of RJ dialogue
would include the following: (1) the offender meets face-to-face with the
victim, representatives of the victim, and/or representatives of the
community; (2) the meeting involves a facilitated dialogue in which all
participants are given an opportunity to share their views of the offense
and its consequences; (3) participants seek consensus as to appropriate
restorative measures to repair harm caused by the offense, which might
include apology, restitution, and community service, in addition to (or in
lieu of) more traditional penal sanctions; and (4) mechanisms are put
into place to ensure the offender's accountability in performing agreed-
upon restorative measures. The RJ dialogue occurs prior to judicial
sentencing. If the dialogue is unsuccessful, or if the offender chooses
not to participate, then the offender might be sentenced in the
conventional manner. If the dialogue produces an agreement, then the
agreement might take the place of a formal judgment or, alternatively,
be embodied in the terms of the formal judgment, possibly along with
additional judicially-determined sanctions or conditions.
Is this model of RJ compatible with uniformity? 5 The answer, I
conclude, is a resounding "it depends." Elsewhere, I have argued that
the term "uniformity" means quite different things to different people.16
It turns out that the notion of similar treatment for the similarly situated
(and different treatment for the differently situated) is not nearly as
simple as it sounds. The uniformity ideal merely begs the question:
What exactly makes two offenders similar in ways that matter to us?
Uniformity is an empty concept without some underlying theory about
the purposes and priorities of the criminal justice system. In particular,
14. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 254. I emphasize here what Professor Braithwaite
refers to as the "process idea of restorative justice," which sees RJ as "a method of bringing
together all stakeholders in an undominated dialogue about the consequences of an injustice
and what is to be done to put them right." JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION 12 (2002). Braithwaite has identified some tension between
"restorative process" and "restorative values," inasmuch as the restorative process, in any
given case, might produce a harshly punitive result that does not reflect important restorative
values "such as apology, repairing of harm, forgiveness, and reconciliation." Id. If RJ were
not viewed chiefly as a process, but, rather, viewed as a system that constrains or mandates
particular outcomes, then the question of its compatibility with sentencing uniformity would
have to be analyzed quite differently than I have done here.
15. Some alternative RJ models pose no apparent difficulty from a uniformity
standpoint, such as post-sentencing victim-offender mediation. Without dismissing the value
of such alternative models, I focus on a pre-sentencing model because this sort of approach
seems to offer the most direct and compelling method of bringing fundamental change to the
criminal justice system.
16. O'Hear, supra note 12, at 3-4.
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I have identified five distinct (and sometimes conflicting) paradigms of
uniformity, each of which contemplates a somewhat different analytical
methodology to distinguish "warranted" from "unwarranted"
sentencing disparity. They are: (1) pre-offense predictability; (2)
retributive proportionality; (3) in-system predictability; (4) purposeful
sentencing; and (5) anti-subjugation. 7 Some of these versions of
uniformity seem quite compatible with RJ, while others are much less
SO.
Elaborating on this point, the Essay proceeds as follows. Part I
considers the compatibility of RJ with the two "static" uniformity
paradigms. These paradigms (pre-offense predictability and retributive
proportionality) emphasize reliance at sentencing on conduct and
circumstances that are external and antecedent to the processes of the
criminal justice system. Part II considers the three "dynamic"
paradigms (in-system predictability, purposeful sentencing, and anti-
subjugation), which permit consideration of the interactions between
offenders, victims, and criminal justice professionals within the system.
I conclude that the dynamic paradigms are more compatible with RJ
than the static. I also suggest some reasons to view the static paradigms
(which pose relatively greater difficulties for RJ) with skepticism. In
short, I do not believe that uniformity concerns provide a compelling
reason to reject RJ.
I. THE STATIC PARADIGMS OF UNIFORMITY
Under the static paradigms, offenders should be differentiated based
chiefly on factors that exist outside and antecedent to the operation of
the criminal justice system. For instance, in a bank robbery case, the
sentence might be determined by reference to such factors as whether
the offender was armed, whether anyone was physically hurt by the
crime, and whether the offender played a major or minor role in
planning the crime. The sentence, however, would not be determined
by such considerations as whether the offender apologized, pled guilty,
or successfully addressed a drug dependency problem after arrest.
There is a necessary tension between RJ and the static paradigms,
inasmuch as RJ permits dialogue (involving victim, offender, and
possibly other interested parties) to play a meaningful role in
17. These are not necessarily the only ways of thinking about uniformity, but they have
played an especially important role in the development of American sentencing policy since
the 1970s. Id. at 4.
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determining sentencing outcomes. RJ dialogue, as understood here,
occurs within the system, and should accordingly be viewed (under the
static paradigms) as irrelevant in determining the sentence.
In principle, there are at least three potential mechanisms for
wedding static views of uniformity to RJ. First, the sentence severity
demanded by the uniformity regime might be regarded as a minimum,
with the actual sentence determined, in whole or part, through RJ
procedures (subject to the uniformity-based minimum). Second, the
uniformity regime might instead establish a maximum sentence, with the
actual sentence again determined through RJ procedures (subject to the
uniformity-based maximum). Finally, the uniformity regime might
establish both a maximum and a minimum. This might mean one
specific severity level or (recognizing some unavoidable imprecision in
implementing concepts like retributive proportionality) a severity range.
If a range, RJ procedures might be used to determine the location of the
sentence within the range. If a specific severity level, then RJ would
have a lesser role, but might be used to help select one of a number of
sentencing options with roughly equivalent bite (e.g., 5 days in jail
versus $1000 in financial penalties versus 100 hours of community
service). In order to assess the workability of these sorts of approaches,
though, some further elaboration of the two static paradigms is
necessary.
A. Pre-offense Predictability
Under the pre-offense predictability ("POP") paradigm, sentencing
laws should be structured such that a prospective criminal may
determine with some specificity prior to the commission of the crime the
sentence that he or she will receive if convicted.18 This paradigm rests
chiefly on the long-standing view that certainty of punishment
contributes more to deterrence than does severity.19 The paradigm
might also be justified as a matter of fair notice to prospective
criminals." In any event, from this perspective, uniformity demands
18. Id. at 46.
19. For instance, this view was central to the criminology of the great eighteenth-century
Italian reformer Cesare Beccaria. CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 58
(Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs-Merrill 1963) (1764). It has also been articulated in recent
years by influential sentencing reformers like Senator Edward Kennedy. See, e.g., Senator
Edward M. Kennedy, Forward, in PIERCE O'DONNELL ET AL., TOWARD A JUST AND
EFFECTIVE SENTENCING SYSTEM: AGENDA FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM viii (1977).
20. This view was suggested, for instance, by Judge Marvin Frankel, who is considered
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above all else that sentences be based on the objective features of the
offender's conduct and the foreseeable consequences thereof. We
should thus avoid sentencing disparities that are based on unforeseeable
contingencies, post-offense conduct, or subjective assessments of the
offender's character or culpability.
There is no reason to believe that RJ processes would typically
produce results conforming to the requirements of the POP paradigm.
Indeed, there are at least four reasons to expect the contrary. First, RJ
provides for the consideration of actual harm, not just hypothetical,
foreseeable harm. Thus, the offender may be held accountable for harm
that is idiosyncratic, in degree or kind, even though this may result in
sentencing consequences that are unpredictable in advance of the crime.
Second, RJ gives weight to the wishes of victims, even though victims
may prefer unexpected, idiosyncratic consequences. Third, RJ also
gives weight to the wishes of offenders, which may evolve in unexpected
directions as a result of participation in the RJ dialogue. Fourth, other
participants in the dialogue (facilitators, community representatives,
family members, etc.) may also make their own unique, individual
contributions that move the sentencing process in unforeseeable
directions.
Despite the inherent theoretical tensions between RJ and the POP
paradigm, could they nonetheless be combined in a satisfactory fashion
in practice? In order to answer this question, we must appreciate that,
in practice, the POP paradigm has long been closely linked with the
ideal of deterrence.2' This suggests another point of tension between RJ
and POP: sentences determined through a POP regime will likely be
much more severe than sentences determined through a pure RJ
process. Recall that RJ is, in essence, about repairing harm,22 suggesting
(if we assume the RJ dialogue is shaped around this principle) that
sentence severity should generally be constrained by the degree of
actual harm caused.23  By contrast, deterrence theory calls for a
one of the chief progenitors of federal sentencing reform. O'Hear, supra note 12, at 12-13, 46.
21. O'Hear, supra note 12, at 46.
22. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 255.
23. I assume a general tendency in this regard. Because I employ a procedural view of
RJ, I must concede the possibility that in some cases victims (and perhaps other participants
in the RJ process) will insist upon hyper-punitive responses that far exceed the harm done. I
assume that such cases will not be the norm, however, because I assume that the dialoguing
process itself will help to check such sensibilities, see infra text accompanying note 44,
particularly if the circle of participants is broader than just offender and victim. See Erik
Luna, Punishment Theory, Holism, and the Procedural Conception of Restorative Justice, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 205, 235 n.161 ("Whatever imbalances of power might result from a dyadic
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multiplier effect based on the (generally low) likelihood that the crime
will be detected, reported, and successfully prosecuted.24  In other
words, the sentence determined in a POP regime will not be constrained
by harm, and might, in fact, be several times more severe than the harm
caused.25
Consider the implications for a hybrid system in which the POP
principle operated merely as the basis of a maximum sentence. The
POP-based maximum would likely be high enough to give RJ processes
plenty of room to operate comfortably. These processes, however, are
unlikely to produce sentences on a consistent basis that are sufficiently
severe to satisfy the proponents of POP.
What if, by contrast, the POP-based sentence were a minimum. This
would satisfy the demands of deterrence theory, but likely undermine
the effectiveness of the RJ processes. If the offender faces, say, a
twenty-year mandatory minimum, the range of restorative options will
be severely cramped. (For instance, the offender will not likely have
sufficient income in prison to make meaningful financial restitution.)
Moreover, the offender, aggrieved by the extraordinary harshness of the
system, is not likely to be in an appropriate frame of mind to recognize
and respond to the harm suffered by his or her victims. Indeed, victims
themselves may view harsh minimums as excessive and have little desire
to participate in a program that imposes further burdens on the
offender,26 or that denies them the opportunity to "get the grace of
[showing] mercy."27 There seems, in short, a profound incompatibility
between RJ and the POP version of uniformity.
Should we view this incompatibility as an important argument
confrontation between the offender and his victim can be avoided by surrounding the key
parties with those most concerned with their well-being."). Additionally, much empirical
research casts doubt on the assumption that revenge is a principle objective of victims.
Heather Strang, Is Restorative Justice Imposing Its Agenda on Victims?, in CRITICAL ISSUES
IN RESTORATIVE JUSTICE 95,96 (Howard Zehr & Barb Toews eds., 2004).
24. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 453,
458-60 (1997). For instance, Professors Robinson and Darley calculate that perpetrators of
assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft face only a 100-to-1 chance of going to
prison for the crime. Id. at 459. Deterrence theory requires that sentence lengths be
increased to account for such low odds. Moreover, social science research points to various
cognitive distortions that might further undermine the deterrent threat of criminal sanctions,
thereby requiring even greater sentence lengths in order to achieve desired levels of
deterrence. Id. at 460-63.
25. O'Hear, supra note 5, at 250-52.
26. Indeed, empirical research indicates that helping the offender is one of the principal
reasons that victims choose to participate in RJ programs. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at
271.
27. John Braithwaite, Holism, Justice, and Atonement, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 389, 391,393.
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against RJ? I think not. Despite its political salience,' the POP
paradigm does not withstand scrutiny as a useful way to think about
uniformity. The difficulty, in essence, is this: with so many important
sources of uncertainty prior to sentencing-will the victim report the
offense, will the police apprehend the offender, will the prosecutor
decide to pursue the case, will the crucial evidence be suppressed, will
the jury convict, etc.-predictability at the sentencing stage seems a
futile gesture. Indeed, given the low risk of successful prosecution, a
prospective criminal would have to be extraordinarily risk-averse to be
deterred by even the certain prospect of a tough sentence after
conviction.z9 There is no reason to believe that prospective criminals are
so risk-averse; indeed, if anything, there is good reason to believe that
most are overly optimistic about the risks they face.' Thus, if embracing
RJ means sacrificing the speculative and dubious benefits of the POP
paradigm, this should not be a matter of particular concern.
B. Retributive Proportionality
Under the retributive proportionality paradigm, offenders should
receive a sentence proportionate to the blameworthiness of their
conduct. 1 Blameworthiness is assessed by reference to two types of
variables: (1) the amount of harm risked or caused by the offender's
conduct, and (2) the offender's personal culpability with respect to the
harm, encompassing such considerations as mens rea and role in the
offense.32 Which specific harm and culpability variables count, and how
28. O'Hear, supra note 12, at 54.
29. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 24.
30. Id. at 460-62. In theory, of course, punishment could be raised to such an
extraordinarily high level of severity that even risk-preferring criminals would pay heed. We
could return, for instance, to the common law rule of capital punishment for all felonies,
including minor thefts. The problem here is enforcement. If mandatory sentences are
perceived as greatly disproportionate to the gravity of the crime, then police will not arrest,
prosecutors will not prosecute, and juries will not convict. Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs.
Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (2000).
Moreover, there are also all of those crimes of passion, desperation, and impaired mental
faculties that have never been thought effectively deterrable.
31. Elsewhere, I have discussed a broader "purposes paradigm" of uniformity and
identified inclusive and discriminating variations. O'Hear, supra note 12, at 45, 48. For
present purposes, I think it helpful to disaggregate the inclusive and discriminating
approaches more fully. What I refer to here as the "retributive proportionality" paradigm is
one especially influential form of the discriminating approach.
32. Paul H. Robinson, A Sentencing System for the 21st Century?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7
(1987).
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much weight they are given, are determined by reference to public
opinion and/or moral theory.33  In any event, offenders who are
personally responsible in similar ways for a similar amount of harm
should receive similar sentences. Likewise, offenders who differ in
significant respects as to harm or culpability should receive different
sentences.
This approach to uniformity has been advanced as a moral mandate,
that is, a valuable end in and of itself, without regard to any other
resulting social benefit.34 The approach has also been justified on
consequentialist grounds. Specifically, this paradigm is said to result in
sentences that reflect public preferences and hence increase public
respect for-and obedience of-the law.3" More succinctly stated,
proponents argue that the retributive proportionality paradigm reduces
crime rates.36
As noted by Umbreit and his colleagues, this approach is in some
tension with the sensibilities of RJ.3" Retributive sentencing always
looks backward, requiring a consideration of what the offender did in
the past as the method for determining how much pain to impose on the
offender in the present. RJ, by contrast, is more forward-looking: a
sentence does not inexorably follow from past conduct, but, rather, from
present needs for repairing harm, as presently understood by
participants in the RJ dialogue. Moreover, retributive proportionality,
like the POP paradigm, treats cases in an abstract fashion, permitting
little consideration of idiosyncratic circumstances and perspectives,
perhaps most notably the victim's willingness to show mercy.
At the same time, as Umbreit and colleagues also note, it is easy to
exaggerate the differences between retributive and restorative justice.38
In particular, both approaches-in contrast to the POP paradigm-
indicate that sentence severity should be closely related to harm. This
33. Robinson, supra note 10, at 380 n.11.
34. Robinson & Darley, supra note 24, at 454.
35. Id.
36. Id. Influential proponents of uniformity have often claimed that a consistent system
of proportionate sentencing will enhance public respect for the law. For examples, see
O'Hear, supra note 12, at 23-24, 26.
37. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 257. See also BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14, at 16
(discussing theoretical debate over whether retributive emotions ought to be accommodated
within RJ framework).
38. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 257. But see Lode Walgrave, Has Restorative Justice
Appropriately Responded to Retribution Theory and Impulses?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 47, 48-49 (arguing that intentionality in inflicting
pain constitutes a "critical" difference between restorative and retributive approaches).
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similarity suggests the possibility of workable retributive-restorative
hybrids. 9
Consider first the retributive sentence as a maximum, with the RJ
process employed to determine the actual sentence within the
maximum. Such. a system would function as a type of "limiting
retributivism," an approach to sentencing with considerable theoretical
support.4°
Would a retributive cap offer sufficient room, though, for RJ to
operate effectively? 4  There are good reasons to believe that RJ
processes would typically produce outcomes within the maximum. First,
both approaches give considerable weight to harm. Second, the
expectations of participants in the RJ dialogue would be conditioned, to
a greater or lesser extent, by the cap. The psychological "anchoring
effect, 42 of the cap (assuming participants are told of the cap) should
help to ensure that sentences within the cap are perceived to be
satisfactory by participants.
Third, retributive proportionality determines sentences on an
abstract, categorical basis, while RJ permits consideration of the actual
offender as a real human being. Empirical evidence suggests that, when
people think about sentencing in the abstract, they tend to assume the
worst about the offender. 43  RJ processes, by contrast, will tend to
humanize the offender, creating realistic possibilities of empathy and
mercy.
39. Notably, a number of prominent punishment theorists have been writing in recent
years about ways of bridging the gap between restorative and retributive paradigms. For
examples, see R.A. Duff, Guidance and Guidelines, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1162, 1185-87
(2005); Andrew von Hirsch et al., Specifying Aims and Limits for Restorative Justice: A
"Making Amends" Model?, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING
OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS? 21, 38 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 2003); Robinson,
supra note 10, at 384-87; Luna, supra note 23, at 206.
40. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 73 (1974).
41. This is a slightly different question than the question of whether RJ processes must
be made subject to some sort of proportionality limitation-a question that has divided RJ
theorists. For a discussion of the debate, see von Hirsch, supra note 39, at 30.
42. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2463, 2515-16 (2004) (describing anchor effect); Michelle D. St Amand & Edward
Zamble, Impact of Information About Sentencing Decisions on Public Attitudes Toward the
Criminal Justice System, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 515, 525 (2001) (discussing empirical study
and concluding "support was obtained for the hypothesis that people anchor themselves to
available information about sentencing trends").
43. See St Amand & Zamble, supra note 42, at 516-17 (discussing research showing that,
when surveyed regarding sentencing, "people tend to think of hardened and vicious criminals
rather than the typical offender").
44. See John Braithwaite, Principles of Restorative Justice, in RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
[89:305
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Finally, as Professor Whitman has suggested in a recent and
provocative body of scholarly work, retributive approaches to
punishment may have an intrinsic tendency to harshness.45 Whitman's
argument is subtle, complex, and deeply informed by his comparative
studies of punishment in American and European history, but goes
something like this. The practice of punishment necessarily establishes
a relationship of inequality between the punisher and the person being
punished, and hence diminishes the social status of the offender. 6 This
inescapable degradation, unless counterbalanced by a self-conscious and
robust commitment to the offender's well-being, tends to unleash
negative emotions towards the offender that may easily "spin out of
control" into vengefulness and extreme harshness 7.4  To the extent this is
true, then retributive proportionality may tend to produce more severe
outcomes than RJ, whose processes do self-consciously seek to
humanize and valorize the offender.
This is not to say that RJ processes will always operate comfortably
within a retributive cap.' There may be some cases, for instance, in
which the victim does not feel the cap fairly reflects the harm that he or
she has actually suffered, which may undermine the victim's motivation
to participate in the RJ dialogue or even leave the victim feeling, not
"restored," but insulted and revictimized On the whole, though, there
AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE PARADIGMS?, supra note 39, at 1,
3 ("[Restorativists] can also be correctly accused of advocating breach of what many
retributivists view as proper lower constraints [on punishment] by advocating mercy as a
value for those who 'deserve' punishment.").
45. See, e.g., James 0. Whitman, A Plea Against Retributivism, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV.
85, 89-90 (2003).
46. Id. at 106.
47. Id. at 107; James Q. Whitman, Making Happy Punishers, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2698,
2701,2716-17 (2005).
48. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 44, at 2-3 (describing debate over whether
retributive or restorative theory provides better assurances that sentences will not breach
upper limit of moral punishment); Jim Dignan, Towards a Systematic Model of Restorative
Justice: Reflections on the Concept, its Context, and the Need for Clear Constraints, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE
PARADIGMS?, supra note 39, at 135, 140 ("[Tjhere can be no guarantee that even restorative
justice conferences will be able to avoid unjust outcomes in which authoritarian figures...
call the shots.").
49. There is an important debate in the RJ literature, however, as to the extent to which
punitive emotions have an appropriate role to play in the RJ process. See, e.g.,
BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14, at 16 (discussing debate); Lode Walgrave, Imposing
Restoration Instead of Inflicting Pain: Reflections on the Judicial Reaction to Crime, in
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE: COMPETING OR RECONCILABLE
PARADIGMS?, supra note 49, at 61, 63-64 ("[T]he intentional obligation to make up is
ethically superior to the intentional infliction of pain .... "). Thus, some RJ theorists might
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is reason to believe that such cases would not be the norm, and that a
retributive-cap system could operate in a manner that is reasonably
respectful in practice of the values embodied in the RJ process."
Many retributivists, however, will object that retributive
proportionality should not be relegated to providing merely a maximum
sentence, but should also provide a minimum.5 Is this approach
compatible with RJ? My concern is that a retributive minimum might
work like a deterrence-based POP minimum: so harsh that restorative
options would be cramped and dialogue participants demoralized.52 The
risk would be greatest with respect to the more serious categories of
crime. Indeed, the tension between RJ and the minimum severity
demands of retributive impulses in serious cases may help to explain
why RJ has been much more successful in penetrating the criminal
justice system with respect to juvenile and misdemeanor crimes than
argue that the possibility that RJ outcomes will exceed the retributive cap is not a point
against the cap, but a point against the purely procedural conception of RJ. See, e.g., Dignan,
supra note 48, at 141-42. Professor Walgrave has argued, though, that the need for some sort
of "just and reasonable limits" on responses to crime does not necessarily imply a cap based
on the principle of retributive proportionality. Walgrave, supra note 38, at 53.
50. I have focused here on the possibility that a retributive cap will unduly constrain the
severity of RJ responses to crime. There is also a possibility that the cap will unduly enhance
the severity of responses. If retributive thinking tends towards harshness, then the anchoring
effect might pull RJ responses higher than they would otherwise be, and perhaps contribute
to a punitive atmosphere in the RJ dialogue that is counterproductive to RJ's healing and
reintegration objectives. Such concerns might be addressed by concealing the retributive cap
from RI participants. This approach, however, might increase the likelihood that the RJ
process would produce outcomes exceeding the cap. In other words, if RJ participants have
no "anchor" in their deliberations, there may be a greater incidence of both very high and
very low sentences, as opposed to a clustering around the cap. It is not immediately clear
which distribution is preferable.
51. The noted retributivist Andrew von Hirsch, for instance, has asserted that, if case
dispositions are negotiated, "it would not seem feasible to impose the kind of rigorous
ordinal-proportionality requirements that a [retributive] model envisions for criminal
punishments.... This is because a considerable leeway would be needed for the parties to
choose a disposition they feel conveys regret in a satisfactory manner." Von Hirsch et al.,
supra note 39, at 31. Von Hirsch has himself proposed a hybrid retributive-RJ sentencing
scheme, with "loosened" proportionality requirements in order to accommodate the need for
negotiating flexibility. Id. at 38. He has not, however, endorsed this proposal as something
that is actually "worth implementing." Id. at 40. Professor Duff has taken a more positive
view of a system of negotiated sentencing in which principles of proportionality would
establish a range of permissible sentences with firm upper and lower limits. Duff, supra note
39, at 1188.
52. Walgrave has made a similar point. Walgrave, supra note 38, at 49 ("The procedure
to determine punishment often interferes with the attention to the harm and suffering caused;
the threat of punishment makes genuine communication about harm and reparation
impossible; and the penalty itself seriously hampers the offender's effort to repair and
compensate.").
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with adult felonies.
Let us assume, at least for the sake of argument, that RJ is
incompatible with retributive minimums. 3 Does this provide a good
reason to reject RJ? The question implicates the rich and long-running
theoretical debate between retributive and restorative justice,54 which I
certainly cannot hope to resolve in this short Essay. I will suggest,
however, a few reasons why even committed retributivists might find it
acceptable to let RJ processes take their course in lieu of insisting on
uniform minimums derived from principles of retributive
proportionality.
First, retributive proportionality, as a system of uniform sentencing,
necessarily shoehorns cases into crude abstract categories," while RJ
processes permit more nuanced consideration of the moral significance
of the actual conduct (and resulting harms) of the real-life human being
who committed the offense. 6 To be sure, RJ processes also permit the
sentence to be affected by other considerations (like mercy) that may
not jibe well with retributive theory.57 Additionally, the RJ dialogue
may itself fail to operate at a morally sophisticated level, resulting in a
consideration of harm and culpability no less crude than that embodied
in a retributive uniformity scheme. Still, RJ does not seem necessarily
any less capable of taking retributive sentencing factors into account in
a meaningful, thoughtful fashion.' Indeed, our concerns about the
53. This seems, for instance, to be Braithwaite's position:
I cannot see how one can nurture restorative values like mercy and forgiveness
while taking retributive proportionality seriously. Upper limits against the
imposition of disproportionately high punishment can and should be part of a
synthesis of just deserts and restorative justice. But lower limits are a roadblock to
victims being able to get the grace of mercy when this is what they see as important
to their own healing.
Braithwaite, supra note 27, at 391.
54. See, e.g., Walgrave, supra note 38; von Hirsch et al., supra note 39.
55. See, e.g., O'Hear, supra note 11, at 253 (discussing shortcomings of United States
Sentencing Guidelines as a coherent proportionality scheme and suggesting that
proportionality "in any truly rigorous form is probably unattainable").
56. Luna has made a similar point. Luna, supra note 23, at 237 n.168 ("The current
approach to criminal sanctioning seeks equality of punishment for similar offenders grounded
in the ideal that two like crimes should receive like punishments. What this theorem misses,
however, is that two ostensibly identical crimes can have widely different harms and
consequences for their victims.").
57. See, e.g., Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1421, 1431 (2004)
(identifying "retributivism's hostility toward mercy").
58. Cf Dignan, supra note 48, at 144 ("[T]he challenge for desert theory that is
presented by restorative justice processes is that they provide an alternative, and arguably far
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ability of a system of retributive proportionality to live up to its own
moral ambitions in practice might be heightened by Professor
Whitman's observations about retributivism "spinning out of control,""
as well as the unavoidable realities of police, prosecutorial, and judicial
discretion in the criminal justice system.'
Second, while retributivism is often justified on the ground that it
(unlike other approaches to punishment) embodies respect for the
autonomy and dignity of offenders and victims,6" conventional criminal
justice procedures, which typically treat the offender as a passive object
to be processed and which often ignore the victim altogether, undercut
the message of respect. RJ procedures, by contrast, give offenders and
victims a greater opportunity for voice and choice, and thus seem more
consistent with a humanizing agenda.62
Third, retributivism is also justified based on its supposed
consistency with public preferences; outcomes based on retributive
principles are thus thought to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the
legal system. 3 There are, however, at least two important difficulties
with this argument. First, it disregards process-even though we know
that the perceived legitimacy of the legal system depends not only on
just outcomes, but also on fair process.' Thus, it is not clear that a
system of retributive proportionality can deliver the legitimacy that it
promises if it employs processes that fail to give victims and offenders a
meaningful opportunity to be heard. RJ, of course, provides a
framework for doing just that.6 Second, the argument may assume a
static, homogenous set of public preferences. Different communities,
more effective form of normative discourse through which to convey censure without
stigma.").
59. Whitman, supra note 47, at 2701.
60. See Luna, supra note 23, at 249.
61. See, e.g., Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1686 (1992) ("[Retribution] is intended to vindicate the
value of the victim denied by the wrongdoer's action through the construction of an event
that not only repudiates the action's message of superiority over the victim but does so in a
way that confirms them as equals by virtue of their humanity.").
62. Duff has likewise argued that disparate outcomes need not be regarded as unjust if
they are a product of a "suitably fair process of mediation or negotiation." Duff, supra note
39, at 1188.
63. Robinson & Darley, supra note 24, at 454.
64. See, e.g., TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW: ENCOURAGING
PUBLIC COOPERATION WITH THE POLICE AND THE COURTS 95-96 (2002) (discussing
empirical research).
65. Empirical research suggests that RJ processes are perceived to be more fair by
participants than are conventional criminal justice processes. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at
278.
[89:305
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE AND UNIFORMITY
however, have quite different views of crime and punishment, 6 and
these views may evolve considerably over time.67 For this reason, I am
particularly skeptical of efforts to implement retributive proportionality
through a monolithic set of national sentencing guidelines. Instead, if
our goal is a system that produces outcomes matching community
preferences, we ought to have a more flexible sentencing process that
seeks community input on a localized basis.68 Once again, RJ provides a
framework for accomplishing this, through the participation of
community representatives in the RJ dialogue.69
II. DYNAMIC UNIFORMITY PARADIGMS
The dynamic versions of uniformity seem less intrinsically prone to
conflict with RJ, as they do not insist so rigidly on basing the sentence
on factors that are antecedent to the RJ dialogue. At the same time,
there are important and varying practical challenges in implementing
these paradigms within an RJ-based criminal justice system. The three
versions of dynamic uniformity are considered separately below.
A. In-system Predictability
Under the in-system predictability ("ISP") paradigm, sentences need
not be predictable at the time the crime is committed (as under the POP
paradigm), but the consequences of the offender's conduct and choices
while he or she is in the criminal justice system must be clear. If the
offender enters into a particular plea deal with the prosecutor, for
instance, the offender must be able to determine the sentencing
consequences of that deal in advance. In all events, there should be no
surprises when the sentence is formally pronounced; the offender will
have effectively determined the sentence through his or her choices in
66. Michael M. O'Hear, National Uniformity/Local Uniformity: Reconsidering the Use of
Departures to Reduce Federal-State Sentencing Disparities, 87 IOWA L. REV. 721, 755-56
(2002).
67. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 305, 308 (1993) (describing late twentieth-century trend towards harsher treatment
of criminals).
68. I have made a number of specific proposals along these lines. See, e.g., O'Hear,
supra note 66, at 766-70; Michael M. O'Hear, Localization and Transparency in Sentencing.
Reflections on the New Early Disposition Departure, 27 HAMLINE L. REV. 358,377-80 (2004).
69. The growing political support for RJ, see Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 291-98,





RJ seems quite compatible with the ISP paradigm. RJ dialogue
gives offenders an opportunity to participate actively in the
determination of the sentence; the sentence emerges from the offender's
interaction with others in the system, and is not imposed unilaterally by
a judge. Of course, RJ also gives offenders a right to opt back into the
conventional sentencing process. Under the ISP paradigm, then, it
would be important for the offender to know the sentencing
consequences of this decision in advance. It would also be important to
limit the discretion of the sentencing judge to override dispositions
achieved through RJ dialogue. These limitations demanded by ISP,
however, do not appear unduly problematic from the RJ perspective.
There is, however, an additional point of greater concern. The ISP
paradigm has been justified as a means to create reliable incentives for
cooperation with prosecutors, particularly by entering a guilty plea
(which saves the government the burdens of a trial) and providing
testimony against other offenders. 70  Restorative justice programs, by
contrast, have traditionally focused primarily on the interests of victims,
who may have quite different interests than prosecutors.7' Where a
prosecutor's overriding objective may be a quick guilty plea, for
instance, the victim's overriding objectives may be a face-to-face
apology and financial restitution. What is to be done if a generous
"guilty plea discount" leaves the offender with a "slap on the wrist" and
no real incentive to enter into dialogue with the victim? 72 In short,
victims may not welcome an intrusion by the prosecutorial agenda into
the victim-offender dialogue, while prosecutors may not welcome an
intrusion by victim agendas into their negotiations with offenders.
This is not necessarily a theoretical dilemma: restorativists often
discuss the need to include a broader set of community interests and
voices in the dialogue beyond those of the most immediate victims of an
offense.73 There seems no reason these interests could not include an
70. O'Hear, supra note 12, at 47, 68-69.
71. See Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 256 ("From a restorative perspective, the primary
stakeholders are understood to be individual victims and their families, victimized
communities, and offenders and their families. The state and its legal system also clearly have
an interest as a stakeholder but are seen as more removed from direct impact. Thus the
needs of those most directly affected by the crime come first.").
72. Cf BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14, at 34 ("Very few criminal offenders who
participate in restorative justice processes would be sitting in the room absent a certain
amount of coercion.").
73. See Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 268. The Marquette University Law School
Restorative Justice Initiative, for instance, describes itself as "supporting victims and
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interest in efficient law enforcement. At the same time, it is not entirely
clear whether a system with robust cooperation incentives will truly
leave enough room in practice for victim-centered RJ processes to
operate effectively."
B. Purposeful Sentencing
Under the purposeful sentencing paradigm, sentences must be
linked in an explicit, deliberative manner to publicly accepted purposes
of punishment.75 This is a view of uniformity as an analytical process.
Disparities must be justified by reference to some general objective of
the criminal justice system, such as crime control or retribution.7 6 The
point of this approach is, in part, to advance such objectives, balancing
them against each other as necessary in a pragmatic fashion. But this
approach may also serve other ends. For instance, purposeful
sentencing may enhance public perceptions of the rationality, and hence
trustworthiness, of the legal system. This approach may also help to
communities through the healing process." Marquette University law School-Restorative
Justice Initiative, http://law.marquette.edu/cgi-bin/site.pl?2130&pagelD=1831 (last visited
Dec. 15, 2005) (emphasis added).
74. The tension here exemplifies the potential conflicts of interest in the RJ process
between what Paul McCold has termed the "micro-community" (those most directly affected
by a crime) and the "macro-community" (the wider society). Paul McCold, What Is the Role
of Community in Restorative Justice Theory and Practice?, in CRITICAL ISSUES IN
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE, supra note 4, at 155,155, 158. McCold would emphasize the needs of
the micro-community, except where "dangerous and uncontrollable offenders need to be
restrained." Id. at 169.
Underscoring the challenges of a multilateral RJ process, involving a variety of divergent
perspectives, empirical research suggests that satisfaction rates have typically been higher
with victim-offender mediation than with group conferencing, which typically has a greater
number of participants. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 274-75. See also id. at 298 (discussing
"pitfall" of attempting to balance many distinct needs in an RJ program), 299-300 (warning
against "attempts by the formal criminal justice system to take over the movement and
fashion it to meet the traditional needs of the system and its bureaucracy").
There is also a risk that attempts to integrate cooperation-inducement and RJ may run
into the same sort of problem that would likely undermine a deterrence-RJ scheme: in order
to achieve desired levels of cooperation, it may be necessary to make baseline sentences so
harsh, and cooperation discounts so steep, that the RJ process would seem like a trivial
afterthought. More empirical research is necessary to determine whether this concern is
justified.
75. This linkage may be made on a case-by-case basis by individual sentencers, or on a
categorical basis by a policy-making body, like a sentencing commission. O'Hear, supra note
12, at 45.
76. Thus, a system structured so as to achieve retributive proportionality would be
consistent with the purposeful sentencing paradigm. However, a sentence need not be
retributive in order to be purposeful in this sense.
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persuade offenders that their sentences are not wholly unjust or
meaningless, and hence contribute to their cooperativeness in custody
and eventual reintegration into the community.77 Purposeful sentencing
may also contribute to dialogue and learning inside and outside the
system concerning the nature of crime and the objectives of criminal
justice.
The purposeful sentencing paradigm seems compatible with RJ,
which also has a pragmatic sensibility in its skepticism of absolutist
claims of "just punishment" and in its desire to repair harm and "put
things right., 78 If there are compatibility problems, they may lie more in
implementation than theory.9 Specifically, the purposeful sentencing
paradigm contemplates a process that persuades the public that
sentences are appropriate and meaningful in light of public interests.
There may be some important operational tensions between this
objective and RJ processes that emphasize private, idiosyncratic
offender-victim interactions. The challenge is to prevent RJ in the
criminal justice system from becoming, in the eyes of the public, the
functional equivalent of the out-of-court settlement process that is so
common in civil litigation. Indeed, even in the civil realm (where the
public interest is typically considered much less compelling than in the
criminal realm), privately negotiated dispute resolution has been
frequently criticized as unprincipled, tainted by bargaining inequality,
and otherwise destructive of important public policy objectives.
77. This perspective played an important role in the thinking of Judge Marvin Frankel,
whose writings played a particularly influential role in the sentencing reform movement of
the 1970s and 1980s. O'Hear, supra note 12, at 14.
78. See, e.g., Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 257 (identifying desert as "central focus" of
retribution, while "victim needs and offender responsibility for repairing harm" are central
focus of RJ); Walgrave, supra note 38, at 56 (arguing that punitive retributivism merely
increases total suffering in the world; RJ is preferable because it takes suffering away).
79. I assume here that the restoration of victims would "count" as an appropriate public
purpose of the criminal justice system. One might argue, however, that restoration is not the
business of a criminal justice system, but of a tort or social insurance system. Yet, restitution
is a commonly accepted component of criminal sentencing, and neither the tort nor the social
insurance system in this country is designed to address the needs of crime victims in a
comprehensive fashion. (For instance, success in the tort system may require hiring a lawyer,
which discourages the pursuit of tort recovery in cases lacking either the prospect of a large
monetary judgment or a defendant with a deep enough pocket to satisfy the judgment.) In
any event, if restoration does not count, RJ might nonetheless be understood as a way to
advance the public interest in reducing recidivism and reintegrating offenders into the
community. See, e.g., Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 284-89 (discussing studies on RJ and
recidivism).
80. For instance, private dispute resolution may be inconsistent with the public interest
in safety, as when confidentiality agreements in product liability settlements prevent the
public from learning the dangers of a product still on the market.
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In light of such concerns, it may be especially important for RJ to
ensure that community interests are addressed in an explicit and
systematic fashion in the RJ process, such that RJ does not take on the
appearance of purely private dispute resolution. There are a number of
ways this might be accomplished. For instance, community
representatives might be included in the RJ dialogue along with the
victim and the offender. Or a judge (perhaps employing sentencing
guidelines) might establish parameters within which dialogue would
occur, in light of the community interest in such objectives as
incapacitation and rehabilitation."1 Or a judge might be required to
ensure that any negotiated resolution is explained on the record by the
RJ participants and reflects consideration of pertinent community
interests.
As with the ISP paradigm, there is a potentially difficult balancing
act to accomplish. While RJ contemplates some role for inchoate
community interests, there is a possibility that, in order to satisfy the
requirements of the purposeful sentencing paradigm, community
interests will be addressed in a manner that undermines RJ's primary
emphasis on victims. For instance, sentencing guidelines based on crime
control interests might routinely demand long prison sentences, to the
detriment of meaningful victim-offender dialogue. In this regard, the
studies, discussed by Umbreit and his colleagues,' that indicate RJ has
important crime control benefits give hope that the public can be
reassured that RJ advances public, not merely private, interests. 3
C. Anti-subjugation
Under the anti-subjugation paradigm, the offender must not be
made subject to the unfettered will of another individual. ' In a nation
committed to ideals of democracy and social equality, the experience of
subjugation degrades the offender, sending the message that the
offender stands outside the community of citizens and merits no higher
81. Of course, to the extent that RJ is successful in reducing recidivism rates, as much
research indicates it may do, see Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 284-89, there will be
correspondingly less need to pursue incapacitative and related crime-control purposes in ways
that constrain RJ processes.
82. Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 284-89.
83. Similarly, McCold argues that the needs of the "macro-community" are generally
best served by RJ processes focused on the needs of the "micro-community" of individuals
most directly affected by an offense. McCold, supra note 74, at 169-70.
84. O'Hear, supra note 12, at 58.
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regard than, say, a domestic pet. Subjugation may, therefore, provoke
strong resentment and impair the eventual reintegration of the offender
into the community.85 More generally, subjugation may diminish respect
for the law, as subjugation establishes important spheres of government
activity in which the rule of law is replaced by the individual will.
To the extent that RJ functions as a consensual process, it seems
quite consistent with the anti-subjugation paradigm. On this view, of
course, RJ ought not be implemented in such a manner that the victim
can effectively dictate the sentence unilaterally. The offender should
have a genuine opportunity to be heard. Further, the offender should
be able to withdraw from the RJ process if the offender does not believe
that it is being carried out in a fair manner. These do not seem
especially problematic constraints. Quite the contrary, the RJ vision of
a genuine dialogic response to crime, including victim, offender, and
community voices, seems far more in tune with anti-subjugation than do
conventional criminal justice processes," which place tremendous
amounts of unilateral power in the hands of prosecutors and/or judges. 7
Indeed, some RJ theorists have argued that a program does not even
qualify as restorative "if it fails to be active in preventing domination."
88
III. CONCLUSION
Professor Umbreit and his colleagues make a compelling case for
RJ, while appropriately recognizing a number of potential pitfalls. In
order for RJ to gain more widespread acceptance in the criminal justice
system, especially with respect to the most serious categories of adult
crime," proponents will need a persuasive response to the uniformity
question. Proponents should first bear in mind that sentencing
uniformity has a range of different meanings and that RJ is more
85. This view was prominent in the thinking of some reformers at the time that
sentencing uniformity emerged as a dominant policy objective in the 1970s. Id. at 58-59.
86. See Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 256 ("Restorative justice.., emphasizes the need
to treat offenders with respect .... "); Braithwaite, supra note 27, at 395 ("[R]estorativists
must reject a radical vision of victim empowerment that says any result the victim wants she
should get .... ").
87. See Luna, supra note 23, at 248 ("[W]hen compared to the dominance of prosecutors
and judges in the traditional system, restorative justice appears far more balanced in its
distribution of power."). For a critique of the power of prosecutors in the federal sentencing
system, see O'Hear, supra note 12, at 61-64.
88. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 44, at 9.
89. See Umbreit et al., supra note 1, at 303 (discussing risk that RJ will be marginalized
by being limited to "only the most minor types of criminal and delinquent offenses").
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compatible with some versions of uniformity than others. If uniformity
means anti-subjugation, for instance, then RJ likely does far more to
advance the ends of uniformity than does the conventional criminal
justice system. If uniformity means that sentences are transparently and
systematically purposeful, then RJ can probably be implemented in a
reasonably uniform fashion. Likewise, if uniformity means that
offenders are given the ability to make well-informed choices while they
are in the criminal justice system, then RJ need not pose
insurmountable obstacles to uniformity.
On the other hand, if uniformity makes rigorous demands of
sentencing outcomes, and particularly to the extent that those demands
include long prison terms, then RJ may be harder to reconcile with
uniformity. The difficulties are likely greatest with respect to the POP
paradigm. This paradigm, however, faces important conceptual and
practical difficulties, and RJ proponents may appropriately argue that
this version of uniformity holds much less appeal than competing
approaches.
Retributive proportionality presents a greater challenge. The
prospects for reconciling RJ with retributive proportionality seem
greatest if: (1) retributive proportionality establishes only a maximum,
rather than a minimum, punishment; (2) to the extent that retributive
proportionality also supplies a minimum, a concerted effort is made to
err on the lenient side in setting the minimum; or (3) RJ is limited to
relatively minor crimes.
Even outside of these circumstances, however-where there is apt to
be some systematic conflict between a serious commitment to RJ and a
serious commitment to retributive proportionality-one may reasonably
favor RJ. In particular, there are plausible reasons to conclude that
retributive proportionality cannot truly accomplish what it sets out to do
without the use of processes that embody respect for offender dignity,
give a meaningful opportunity for all interested parties to be heard, and
give voice to community values on a localized basis. RJ provides a
framework for addressing these needs. Thus, even committed
proponents of retributive proportionality might find some appeal in RJ
processes and common ground with RJ proponents who seek a
transformative restructuring of the criminal justice system.
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